讲座介绍
题 目：Executive replacement threat and corporate risk-taking: evidence from Chinese non-SOE firms
主讲人：沈吉
时 间：2024年5月28日14:30
地 点：立德楼（北二楼）321
摘要
Empirical evidence on the relations between CEO turnover threat and risk-taking behavior and firm performance is generally confounded by serious endogeneity issues. We circumvent these endogeneity problems by exploiting the SOE (state-owned enterprises) managers’ Compensation Reform Program (CRP) in China as an exogenous increase in CEO turnover threat in non-SOE firms. Specifically, we show that the adoption of the CRP leads to a significant increase in the sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to performance. Using this exogenous variation in CEO turnover threat, we find that greater turnover threat leads to lower operating income volatility and better performance. The lower risk levels are largely due to threatened CEOs adopting more diversified operating strategies and acquisitions and less risky investments. The decrease in firm risk is more pronounced for firms in industries with greater labor market mobility, less SOE concentration and CEOs with worse performance and less job security.
主讲人介绍
沈吉，现任北京大学光华管理学院金融学系副教授。他在伦敦政治经济学院获得金融学博士学位。主要研究方向包括：有摩擦金融市场的资产定价理论，公司金融，金融市场，数字经济。近年来在《经济研究》、《金融研究》《世界经济》和Review of Financial Studies、Management Science等中外期刊发表论文多篇。