Robust contracts with one-sided commitment
主讲人：邹镇涛
时 间：2022年11月24日19:30-21:30
地 点：腾讯会议：338-516-751
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摘 要：In this paper, we consider a robust contract with limited commitment in continuous time, in which the principal (firm) is ambiguity averse and seeks robust decisions. First, we find the existence of limited commitment not only attenuates the negative effect of model uncertainty on the firm value, but also makes the firm less pessimistic. Moreover, concerns regarding model misspecification motivate the firm to increase the worker’s exposure to the productivity shocks via the optimal contract. Finally, our theoretical model predicts that the combination of limited commitment and ambiguity generates both right skewness and decreases in the wage dynamics as the empirical data.
主讲人介绍：邹镇涛，武汉大学金融系副研究员，博士毕业于上海财经大学。研究领域为动态公司金融。近年研究成果发表于《Economic Theory》、《Journal of Banking and Finance》、《Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control》、《European Journal of Operational Research》、《Economics Letters》等国外重要学术期刊上。主持国家自然科学基金青年项目一项。